We compile a database of energy uses, energy sources, and carbon dioxide emissions for the USA for the period . We use a model to extrapolate the missing observations on energy use by sector. Overall emission intensity rose between 1850 and 1917, and fell between 1917 and 2002. The leading cause for the rise in emission intensity was the switch from wood to coal, but population growth, economic growth, and electrification contributed as well. After 1917, population growth, economic growth and electrification pushed emissions up further, and there was no net shift from fossil to non-fossil energy sources. From 1850 to 2002, emissions were reduced by technological and behavioural change (particularly in transport, manufacturing and households), structural change in the economy, and a shift from coal to oil and gas. These trends are stronger than electrification, explaining the fall in emissions relative to GDP.
Introduction
Energy is at the core of some of the greatest environmental and geopolitical challenges of our time. Cheap and plentiful energy -deemed necessary for our current standard of living -can at the moment only be supported by oil and coal, which pollutes the air, changes the climate, and, in the case of oil and gas, comes from unstable regions. Besides stimulating less polluting energy sources, it is important to improve the overall energy efficiency of the economy through technological, behavioural and other changes. For that, one needs to understand how and why energy use has changed in the past. This paper contributes to that. The above studies are all on a national basis. Working with data for 1960 -1999 , Aldy (2005 finds different EKCs for per capita CO 2 emissions for different US states. Kahn (1998) finds an EKC in micro-data for vehicle emissions in California. Based on a sample of five countries for the 1990s, Lenzen et al. (2006) find no evidence of an EKC for energy use by households; instead, energy use increases monotonically with income and expenditure. They do find that this relationship is different for different countries.
Rothman (1998) argues that changes in emissions need to be understood in terms of changes in consumption patterns, and that such analysis should include domestic production as well as imports and exports. Kahn (2003) shows that the energy intensity of US imports has converged with the energy intensity of US production, which suggests that the trade effect is small. Nonetheless, Suri and Chapman (1998) find that the inclusion of international trade alters the EKC for per capita energy use in an analysis of 33 countries for 1971 -1991 . Kriström and Lundgren (2005 regress CO 2 emissions on per capita income and its square, like most other EKC studies. They restrict the analysis to one country (Sweden) but include data from 1900 to 1999. They find strong evidence for an EKC, with emissions peaking in the early 1970s. Lindmark (2002) finds a similar result for Sweden for the period 1870-1997. Structural changes in the economy are implicitly included, but not explicitly because of data limitations.
Lindmark (2004) uses CO 2 and income data for a large number of countries for the period 1850-2000. He finds clear evidence for an EKC between CO 2 intensity and per capita income, with some countries turning at $5000 (this includes the USA; see Figure 1) 1 , some at $10,000 and some at both. His data do not allow him to explore the underlying relationships. Our study does that, but only for the USA. For this, we rely on decomposition.
Lorna Greening (2004; Greening et al., 1997 Greening et al., , 1998 Greening et al., , 1999 Greening et al., , 2001 ) sets the empirical standard for the index decomposition of trends in CO 2 emissions for OECD countries, including the USA. Her analyses are limited to the period since 1970. Davis et al. (2002) decompose US energy use and carbon dioxide emissions for the period 1986-2000. They find that weather may have contributed to the recent acceleration of decarbonisation. Casler and Rose (1998) use structural decomposition for the US for 1972-1982; they ascribe most of the observed changes in CO 2 emissions to fuel switching and energy efficiency. The relatively short period in these seven studies is no exception. Indeed, the 124 decomposition studies surveyed by Ang and Zhang (2000; see also the earlier survey in Huntington, 1989) cover the last 40 years when detailed data were available. Golove and Schipper (1998) go back furthest (for the USA), to 1958.
There are a few studies of historical developments of energy. Most focus on a specific subject, such as light (Nordhaus, 1997; Fouquet and Pearson, 2006) or prices (Fouquet and Pearson, 2003) . Other studies are more descriptive (Fouquet and Pearson, 1998; Grübler, 1998; Smil, 1994) . This paper is comprehensive and analytical.
Data
Marland see also Andres et al., 1999) report carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use (for coal, oil and gas), gas flaring and cement production for . Note that the emission data are constructed from fossil fuel production data for the earlier years (Etemad et al., 1991) , and only corrected for international trade as of 1850 (based on Schurr et al., 1960) .
See Figure 2 . Note that we only consider emissions from fossil fuel consumption; cement production (not energy-related) and gas flaring (production, not consumption) are omitted, as are emissions from changes in land use. Coal was the dominant source until 1945. In 2002, 42% of CO 2 emissions was from oil, 36% from coal, and 22% from gas.
Figure 2 also has our alternative estimates of carbon dioxide emissions. For this, we used the average emission coefficients for the last fifty years of Marland et al. (2005) . Note that this is direct consumption only; for example, the energy used for producing fertiliser is attributed to manufacturing rather than to agriculture (e.g., Cleveland, 1995) . IEA (2005) also has "unspecified" consumption; there are simultaneous shifts in "unspecified" and "agriculture" and in "unspecified" and "residential", so we ascribed most of "unspecified" to these two sectors. Final energy consumption can also be constructed from EIA (2005) data, but agriculture is grouped with manufacturing. We are not aware of earlier data for final energy consumption by sector. Figure 4 shows the results. Final energy consumption rose by 92% between 1960 and 2002. Energy consumption by the transport sector rose fastest (172%), followed by services (156%). Residential energy consumption rose by 61%, and manufacturing by 38%. Agricultural energy consumption fell by 33%. In 2002, 42% of all energy consumption was in transport, 26% in manufacturing, 18% in residential, 13% in services, and 1% in agriculture. In 1960, primary energy consumption was 46% larger than final energy consumption; in 2002, this had risen to 66% with growing electrification. See Figure 7 .
The sectoral composition of gross domestic product can be found in Mitchell (1998) from 1869 onwards. We add "industry" and "construction", and "transport and communication" and "commerce". WRI (2005) reports the sectoral composition for 1971-2001. For the overlapping years, the two data-sets agree. We use WRI (2005) as the data are reported annually. We assume that there was no sectoral change between 1850 and 1869, and that 2002 equals 2001. See Figure 5 . In 1869, 58% of the US economy was in services, 24% in agriculture, and 21% in manufacturing. In 2001, services had risen to 75%, and manufacturing to 23%, while agriculture had fallen to 2%.
Population and GDP are taken from . Between 1850 and 2002, the US population rose 12-fold, from 23 million to 288 million. GDP rose 217-fold, from $43 billion to $9.2 trillion. Consequently, GDP per capita went up 18-fold, from $1,800 to $32,000 per year.
The model
The main purpose of this paper is to explain the trends in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions. The growth of the population and the economy only partly explain the increase in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions. Energy supply, the structure of the economy, technology and behaviour all changed. We have data on the first two components, but unfortunately cannot separated technological from behavioural change.
For the period 1960-2002, we have data on both energy consumption by sector, and the share of this sector in the economy. This defines the sectoral energy intensity, trends in which capture technological and behavioural change. In order to extrapolate this to the period 1850-1960, we first constructed a statistical model of the sectoral energy intensities. For agriculture, manufacturing and services, the energy intensity follows an exponential trend, attenuated by price changes (from Schurr et al., 1960, and EIA, 2005) . For transport and residential, energy intensity follows price and per capita consumption expenditures (from Liesner, 1987, and BEA, 2005) . Parameters were fitted by minimum least squares, 3 where the observations are sectoral final energy consumption for 1960-2002, and primary energy consumption for 1850-2002. The ratio of primary and final energy consumption follows an exponential trend, the parameters of which are fitted in the same procedure.
This model performs rather poorly. This may be because 40 years of data is too few from a 150 year period. The model may also be too crude. For instance, the manufacturing sector has changed in many ways, the results of which cannot be captured by a single exponential trend.
Therefore, we constructed a second model, in which the energy intensities vary from year to year, but cannot deviate more than 2% 4 from the energy intensity of the previous year. The wedge between primary and final energy use still grows exponentially with time. The results for this second model are shown in Figures 4, 7 and 8.
When there are observations (whole period, primary energy; 1960-2002, final energy), confidence intervals are based on the model error. For 1850-1959, for final energy, model errors follow from the model error of primary energy attributed to the sectors in proportion to their share in primary energy. For final energy, the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of observations minus one plus the number of times the energy intensities changes the maximum of 2%; for primary energy, two additional parameters were estimated for the wedge between primary and final energy. (1990) , who report that electricity was hardly used in the USA before 1900.
Decomposition
Having build the database and filled in the gaps with the model described above, we now turn to decomposing the "observed" trends. We split the period 1850-2002 into three periods: 1850-1917, 1917-1960, and 1960-2002 . The energy intensity of the US economy reached its maximum in 1917. Sectoral energy consumption data begin in 1960.
We split the change in carbon dioxide emissions into six components, viz. changes in:
1. Population;
2. Per capita income; 3. Energy intensity;
4. Conversion efficiency (the ratio of primary and final energy consumption);
5. Fossil / non-fossil mix (the ratio of fossil and total primary energy use); and 6. Fossil fuel mix (the ratio of carbon dioxide emission and fossil primary energy use).
These are all single indicators, except for the energy intensity. We decompose changes in the energy intensity into changes in the structure of the economy and changes in the sectoral energy intensity due to technological and behavioural change. We use the Törnqvist index (or multiplicative, arithmetic mean Divisia index; see Hoekstra and Van der Bergh, 2003) for this. If I t denotes the energy intensity at time t, then 
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and E denotes energy use. D R is a rest term, that equals the interaction between D I and D S ; the interaction effect is small in the application below. We refer to D S as the structural effect, and to D I as the effect of technology and behaviour.
Note that we have only energy consumption for transport and residential, but no date on their share in the economy; energy intensity cannot be defined. Therefore, we ascribe all changes in energy consumption in these sectors to "technology and behaviour". As a result, "structure" is means "structure of production (excl. transport)". Table 2 shows the results. Between 1850 and 1917, CO 2 emissions increased 82 fold, or 6.7% per year. The largest contributor with a factor 12.5 is the switch from fuelwood to coal. This is somewhat dampened (a factor 0.95) by the introduction of oil and gas, which have lower emission coefficients. Population (4.4), income (2.9) and electrification (1.3) are smaller contributors. An increase in energy efficiency reduced emissions growth by a factor 0.4. Table 3 further details the changes in energy efficiency. In production, efficiency decreased by a factor 1.2, most of which was structural change (from agriculture to manufacturing). Transport efficiency fell by a factor 1.3, or 0.4% per year. The increase in energy efficiency is entirely due to the residential sector, which improved at 2.3% per year. The share of residential in final energy use fell from 80% in 1850 to 40% in 1917.
Between 1917 and 1960, the growth in CO 2 emissions was much slower: 1.3% per year. Population growth decelerated, but economic growth accelerated. The biggest contribution to the deceleration, however, was that most traditional fuels had already been replaced by fossil fuels; wood-to-coal still contributed a factor 1.1 to emissions growth over the period. Electrification contributed a similar factor; electrification was slower between 1917 and 1960 than between 1850 and 1917. The replacement of coal by oil and gas reduced emissions by a factor 0.75, which is considerably faster than in the previous period. Increases in energy efficiency again did most to slow the growth of emissions; at 1.4% per year, this was faster than in the previous period (1.3%). In this period, production and transport became more energy efficient, not less as in the previous period. Production efficiency improved by a factor 0.77, largely because of technological change. Transport efficiency improved by 1.2% per year, while improvements in residential energy use accelerated to 2.9%.
Between 1960 and 2002, the growth in CO 2 emissions accelerated again to 1.7% per year. Population growth decelerated further (a factor 1.6), but income growth accelerated again (2.8). Electrification gathered pace again (1.1), and power production switched back to coal (1.0). The introduction of nuclear power and, to a lesser extent, renewables reduced the growth in CO 2 emissions by a factor 0.9. Increases in energy efficiency dampened emissions growth by a factor 0.5, which is again faster than in the previous period. Production efficiency increased by 2.1% per year, one third of which was structural change. Transport efficiency increased by 0.9% per year, and residential efficiency by an annual 2.1%. By 2002, residential energy use was only 18% to final energy use, while transport had risen to 42%, up from 8% in 1850. Figure 9 shows the results of decomposing CO 2 trends on an annual basis. Note that the data were smoothed by the 11-year running mean. The broad features are obviously as described above, but additional details emerge. CO2 emissions fell during the Great Depression, largely because of economic shrink. World War II saw a rapid rise of emissions, again largely because of economic growth. Technological change accelerated in World War II and again after during the 1970s and 1980s (because of the oil crises). There were also periods, notably the 1900s when the economy became less energy efficient.
Virtual wedges
Pacala and Socolow (2004) introduce "wedges" to discuss policies to reduce future CO 2 emissions. Each wedge represents a specific set of technologies that reduce or avoid emissions. Emission reducing technologies that would be adopted without climate policy can be dubbed "virtual wedges". Figure 10 shows the virtual wedges for the period 1917-2002.
We cumulatively decomposed CO2 emission trends, with 1917 as the base year; 1917 was the year in which emission intensity peaked. Over this period, emissions were reduced by changes in the fossil fuel mix, in the structure of the economy, and in technology and behaviour. Figure 10 shows what the emissions would have been, had these parameters stayed at their 1917 values. We split the contribution of technology and behaviour into the five energy sectors, on the basis of their respective emission intensity trends and their share in final energy consumption. Transport contributed most (9.2 Pg CO 2 ), followed by manufacturing (7.0 Pg CO 2 ). The contributions of services (2.3 Pg CO 2 ), residential (2.1 Pg CO 2 ) 5 and agriculture (1.0 Pg CO 2 ) were much less. Changes in technology and behaviour, particularly in transport and manufacturing, have therefore been the main drivers of changes in the carbon intensity of the US economy since 1917.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we compile a database of energy uses, energy sources, and carbon dioxide emissions for the USA for the period 1850-2002. We use a model to extrapolate the missing observations on energy use by sector. Overall emission intensity rose between 1850 and 1917, and fell between 1917 and 2002 . The leading cause for the rise in emission intensity was the switch from wood to coal, but population growth, economic growth, and electrification contributed as well. After 1917, population growth, economic growth and electrification pushed emissions up further, and there was no net shift from fossil to non-fossil energy sources. From 1850 to 2002, emissions were reduced by technological and behavioural change (particularly in transport, manufacturing and households), structural change in the economy, and a shift from coal to oil and gas. These trends are stronger than electrification, explaining the fall in emissions relative to GDP.
This paper goes beyond the environmental Kuznets curve literature in that it looks at a longer time-period, and in that it decomposes the EKC into its constituent trends. The decline in CO2 emission intensity since 1917 is driven by market forces in the energy sector, by the development of the economy, and by technological and behavioural change. Opening the black box of the EKC allows for improved policy advice and better future projections.
This paper goes beyond the decomposition literature in that it looks at a longer time period, partially by virtue of complementing observations with model data. This allows us to put recent trends in an historic context.
Future research should improve on the work presented here. Crucially, earlier data on energy use by sector are needed -if not a complete time series, then some data points to constrain the model before 1960. Early accounts of US energy use including wind, water and animal power would be welcome. Also, energy use in transport and households need to be split into activity levels (e.g., miles travelled) and energy intensities. These three points are the major shortcomings of this study. Replication of the current study for other countries would shed light on the question which of the features found here are specific to the USA, and which are universal.
For climate policy, the following results emerge. Firstly, the USA started its transition to a more energy-and carbon-extensive economy at around $5000 per person per year. Much of South America and Southeast Asia is already past that level, and China is getting there rapidly. These countries may mimic the US trajectory or, with the help of modern technologies, decarbonise faster. Secondly, on a pessimistic note, trends in the US have been fairly constant over the period 1917-2002. This suggests that there a deeper cause, which may be hard to beat should the USA decide to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions more rapidly. Thirdly, on an optimistic note, the US has been through two major energy transitions in the last 150 years without economic crises. This suggests that the USA can repeat this trick in the current century. 
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